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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERICAN BEVERAGE ASSOCIATION,  
et al.,  
  
Plaintiffs,  
  
v.  
  
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN  
FRANCISCO,  
  
Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-03415-EMC

**ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’  
MOTION FOR INJUNCTION PENDING  
APPEAL**

Docket No. 69

Previously, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. *See* Docket No. 68 (order). In response, Plaintiffs have now moved for an injunction pending appeal of that order. Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby conditionally **GRANTS** Plaintiffs’ motion.<sup>1</sup>

The Court has the authority to issue an injunction pending appeal, notwithstanding its denial of preliminary injunctive relief, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(c). That rule provides that, “[w]hile an appeal is pending from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction, the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c).

The City argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under Rule 62(c) because the rule specifies that relief may be given “[w]hile an appeal is pending,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(c), and, here, Plaintiffs have not yet filed a notice of appeal. However, as Plaintiffs argue, this position is not

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<sup>1</sup> The parties agreed to forego a hearing on the motion.

1 persuasive. The Wright & Miller treatise explains as follows:

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3 Rule 62(c) says that the district court may act in connection with  
4 injunctions “while an appeal is pending.” It may be argued that this  
5 means that the court may not make an order under Rule 62(c) before  
6 the appeal has been taken, and further, that after the taking of the  
7 appeal the district court no longer has jurisdiction of the case.  
8 However, those arguments would make the rule a nullity and are  
9 unsound. When there is reason to believe that an appeal will be  
10 taken, there is no reason why the district court should not make an  
11 order preserving the status quo during the expected appeal. The  
12 order can be conditioned on an appeal being taken by a stated date.

13 Wright, *et al.*, 11 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2904 (3d ed.).

14 The Court now turns to the issue of what factors are considered in determining whether a  
15 party is entitled to an injunction pending appeal. Plaintiffs argue that the typical preliminary  
16 injunction factors are considered. *See Protect Our Water v. Flowers*, 377 F. Supp. 2d 882, 883  
17 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that, “[i]n deciding whether to grant an injunction pending appeal, courts  
18 apply the standard employed when considering a motion for a preliminary injunction”); *see also*  
19 *Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts*, 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating  
20 that, “[a] plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on  
21 the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the  
22 balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest”). Relying on  
23 *Hilton v. Braunskill*, 481 U.S. 770 (1986), which formally addressed a request for a stay of an  
24 order pending appeal rather than an injunction, the City argues that the party seeking an injunction  
25 pending appeal must make a “strong showing” of likelihood of success on the merits. *Id.* at 776.  
26 At the very least, the City argues, Plaintiffs here “must make an ‘even stronger showing’ that they  
27 will succeed on the merits than they did in their preliminary injunction motion.” Opp’n at 2. *See,*  
28 *e.g., See Bayless v. Martine*, 430 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that, “[s]ince appellants  
failed to make out a prima facie case demonstrating a reasonable probability of success on the  
merits[,] a fortiori they did not make that even stronger showing that is prerequisite to the grant of  
a stay and the issuance of an injunction pending a hearing on the merits of an interlocutory  
appeal”).

It is questionable, however, whether *Hilton* should apply to a motion for injunction

1 pending appeal of an order denying a preliminary injunction. Under the City’s position, a party  
2 who is denied a preliminary injunction (because the requisites for preliminary injunction relief are  
3 not met) could never get an injunction from the district court pending appeal. *See Protect*, 377 F.  
4 Supp. 2d at 884 (stating that “[s]everal courts have observed that the ‘success on the merits factor  
5 cannot be rigidly applied,’ because if it were, an injunction would seldom, if ever, be granted  
6 ‘because the district court would have to conclude that it was probably incorrect in its  
7 determination on the merits’”). Such a result would not be consistent with the express language of  
8 Rule 62(c) which contemplates the possibility that the district court may grant an injunction  
9 pending appeal from an interlocutory order denying preliminary injunction. “An injunction is  
10 ‘frequently issued where the trial court is charting a new and unexplored ground and the court  
11 determines that a novel interpretation of the law may succumb to appellate review.’” *Id.* *See*  
12 *Leiva-Perez v. Holder*, 640 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that, “[a]fter noting the various  
13 interests of the state and the petitioner that the court could take into consideration in adjudicating  
14 the stay request, *Hilton* explained that the balance of the relative equities ‘may depend to a large  
15 extent upon determination of the State’s prospects of success in its appeal’”).

16 Thus, an injunction pending appeal may be appropriate, even if the Court believed its  
17 analysis in denying preliminary injunctive relief is correct. This is such a case.

18 Although the Court believes it correctly decided the issues presented, it recognizes that the  
19 Ninth Circuit has not squarely decided whether and how *Zauderer* applies to the context of this  
20 case: *i.e.*, a compelled disclosure in the context of commercial speech where the government  
21 interest is not consumer deception, but public health and safety. Furthermore, as the Court  
22 acknowledged in its order denying preliminary injunctive relief, there is at least a close question as  
23 to whether Plaintiffs have raised serious questions on the merits, particularly because the  
24 compelled disclosure has a 20% size requirement which is “not insubstantial.” Docket No. 68  
25 (Order at 26, 30). There is thus a plausible argument that there are serious questions on the merits  
26 and irreparable injury (*see Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court*, 303 F.3d 959, 973-74 (9th  
27 Cir. 2002)). In addition, there is a good chance that the injunction pending interlocutory appeal  
28 will be relatively brief because the appeal will likely be resolved on an expedited basis (given

1 Ninth Circuit Rule 3-3, which allows for expedited briefing on preliminary injunction appeals and  
2 thus the hardship to the City may be limited).

3 Accordingly, in light of these particular circumstances the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion  
4 for an injunction pending appeal.

5 Finally, to the extent Plaintiffs seek clarification on footnote 1 of the Court's order denying  
6 preliminary injunctive relief, that request is granted. Footnote 1 more accurately should read (with  
7 new language in bold):

8  
9 Plaintiffs have not delayed in seeking preliminary injunctive relief.  
10 Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit on July 24, 2015. See Docket No. 1  
11 (complaint). On the same day, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary  
12 injunction **regarding the other ordinance**. See Docket No. 14  
13 (motion). Subsequently, the parties agreed that the City would not  
14 enforce **that** ordinance pending a final judgment in this case. See  
15 Docket No. 35 (stipulation and order, filed in August 2015). A few  
16 months thereafter, the Court set a hearing and briefing schedule for  
17 the preliminary injunction motion **regarding this ordinance**. See  
18 Docket No. 45 (stipulation and order, filed in October 2015).

19 This order disposes of Docket No. 69.

20 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

21 Dated: June 7, 2016

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EDWARD M. CHEN  
United States District Judge