HSBC Direct Prevents Keyloggers From Stealing Your Account
First we just liked our HSBC Direct account for its 5.05% APY. Then we found its security system pretty neat.
HSBC Direct makes you create two passwords. One you type in. The other you click in. This helps prevent against the possibility of someone using a keylogger to steal your bank account information.
Fantastic! — BEN POPKEN
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Mr. Weaver: Maybe it's a little harsh to say that it doesn't do any good.
While there are certainly attacks that this method doesn't protect you from, there are lots of common attacks (like standard keyloggers, and hardware keyloggers) that this method effectively defends against.
Those of use that don't use this bank can add this level of security to our own banking: all modern operating systems offer an on-screen keyboard, as an assistive device for the handicapped. Just use that for your password. Or even just PART of your password.
My B of A credit account uses a "sitekey" where I have to verify that the picture they show me is correct as I log in. I use PayMyBills.com to manage all my bills, and B of A's system isn't compatible with their system (the only one with that problem). Now I have to go to B of A's website directly to pay the accounts, which is annoying and inconvenient.
ING has yet ANOTHER layer of protection: you choose a secret picture when you sign up (like a picture of a cat, or of Doritos, or a hammock) and then they show it to you after you've logged in. If you don't see the picture that you picked, you know you've just given away your login info to someone nefarious.
Do they have keyloggers and spyware for Macs? I feel all smug and secure with mine, but I worry that I'm wrong about Macs being completely safe.
My HSBC account has a little keyfob with a button on it. It's internal timer will cause it to generate a unique code which will match HSBC's database, because they know which unit I have and what timer is in it. It's a little bit annoying to have to dig it out each time, but it's fairly darn secure!
Keylog that, bitches! :-)
In the case of the on-screen keyboard, if a keylogger is already living on your computer, you're screwed. It shouldn't be surprising to find other malware that will capture mouseclicks, etc. Attacks are more costly -- the attacker has to get more software on your computer -- but I don't think it would be that much more costly, given how one piece of malware tends to invite friends along.
Bruce Schneier has an old discussion on why even two-factor authentication, i.e., those keyfobs with ever-changing numbers on them, while they may help to some extent, aren't a magic bullet:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/the_failure_...
Basically, the attack model two-factor is meant to address is the passive listener. Modern attacks are geared more towards active, man-in-the-middle attacks that will use that RSA SecureID code during the minute it's valid.
I have both HSBC and ING.
I think ING does a better job.
1. I need to remember two passwords for HSBC.
To much security causes less security, since
this leads to "yellow stickies" with the password written on them.
2. ING something much better for it's keyboard.
It's only a 0-9 keypad for a numeric PIN, but it also has letters associated with the numbers. You can click, but you can also type in the letters. The great thing about this is the letters are randomly assigned per sesion. So A might be a 0 for one session and a 1 for the next. So the key loggers would not get anything useful.
I have a key fob as well (it's an RSA SecurID) for my E-Trade account. It shows a 6-digit code that changes every 60 seconds, which is clock synchronized to their auth system. My password is a combination of a traditional password plus the code from the SecurID. This is known in the business as two-factor authentication - something you "know" along with something you "have".
One thing I'd like to see would be some sort of centralized auth system that allows me to use a single SecurID with accounts from multiple financial service providers. If more of my banks/credit card companies/brokerages/etc start using these, I'm not looking forward to keeping 3-4 of these things on my keychain.
This is part of a Federal Reserver/FDIC guidance that was supposed to be imposed by end of 2006. All online banking/financial site must use multiple factor authentication system. One way to do this is through a keyfob (ie RSA SecurID).
Do they have keyloggers and spyware for Macs? I feel all smug and secure with mine, but I worry that I'm wrong about Macs being completely safe.
smug people should at least know how to use google.
http://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-a&rls=org.mozi...
furthermore, hardware keyloggers aren't unheard of.
what is, however, is someone *actually* having a keylogger on their system. Anyone have personal experience with this in the wild?* Like, beyond a prank by your co-worker?
* personal meaning you know a dude -- not that you know a dude on the internet. we all know a dude on the internet, dudes.
I think most people are missing the point here. Most protection schemes are not designed for your actual protection (although that is a secondary purpose), but in order to make you feel "comfortable" with banking online. Online banking not only saves you time, it saves your bank time (which is money), and so is highly desirable from a profit standpoint. There is a huge incentive for banks to make you feel safe when you are banking online. It is like the corporate-financial equivalent to making you discard your liquids at the airport... its most important function is to let you know the people in charge are "doing something" about the problem.
The truth is, no matter what the security procedures in place, a good chunk of people will simply not be technically savvy enough to figure out if a site is legit or part of a phishing scheme.
I am a former HSBC customer. I left because of their poor service and urge you to consider taking your business elsewhere.
One month, HSBC paid my rent check to my landlord twice--ten days apart, for reasons I never understood. Though the error was all HSBC's, and though they surely had the money lying around, I couldn't get my money from them for a week, and no one in the entire organization would even pretend to give a damn (until I closed my account).
Also, their fees are high, their Web banking is hard to use, their branches are understaffed, and their telephone associates don't speak English as well as they need to.
I believe INB Direct (mentioned above) started this long before HSBC started the practice. ING Direct's model is a little more accesible in that it allows typing _letters_ that change each time. For example, the number 1 might be "L" today and "J" tomorrow. It allows users who can't easily click (eg, through a mobile browser) to access their account. Of course, the security of acccessing one's bank account via a mobile phone might be questionable, but at least somebody with a scanner won't be able to get the password even if they can get through the SSL.











Yep, ING Direct has it, too. Very cool.